{"id":5687,"date":"2026-03-27T03:35:20","date_gmt":"2026-03-27T03:35:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/2026\/03\/27\/who-is-fighting-in-myanmars-multi-front-civil-war\/"},"modified":"2026-03-27T03:35:20","modified_gmt":"2026-03-27T03:35:20","slug":"who-is-fighting-in-myanmars-multi-front-civil-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/2026\/03\/27\/who-is-fighting-in-myanmars-multi-front-civil-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Who is fighting in Myanmar\u2019s multi-front civil war?"},"content":{"rendered":"<div aria-live=\"polite\" aria-atomic=\"true\">\n<p>Myanmar has entered the sixth year of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/3\/24\/russian-weapons-tactics-seen-in-ukraine-are-shaping-myanmars-civil-war\">a brutal civil war<\/a> that the military regime, which seized control of the country in 2021, is increasingly confident it can win.<\/p>\n<p>The conflict was triggered when the country\u2019s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing ousted an elected government and detained civilian leaders, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.<\/p>\n<section>\n<h2>Recommended Stories <\/h2>\n<p><span>list of 4 items<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span>list 1 of 4<\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/3\/16\/myanmar-parliament-dominated-by-pro-military-party-convenes-after-5-years\">Myanmar parliament dominated by pro-military party convenes after 5 years<\/a><\/li>\n<li><span>list 2 of 4<\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/2\/3\/global-conflicts-pushing-humanitarian-law-to-breaking-point-report-warns\">Global conflicts pushing humanitarian law to breaking point, report warns<\/a><\/li>\n<li><span>list 3 of 4<\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/2\/26\/near-blind-rohingya-refugee-dies-after-us-agents-left-him-far-from-home\">Near-blind Rohingya refugee dies after US agents left him far from home<\/a><\/li>\n<li><span>list 4 of 4<\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/3\/4\/uk-to-end-study-visas-for-myanmar-afghanistan-cameroon-sudan-students\">UK to end study visas for Myanmar, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Sudan students<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span>end of list<\/span><\/section>\n<p>That power grab reversed a decade of fragile democratic transition and produced not only a military dictatorship but a nationwide uprising \u2014 neither of which was new to this Southeast Asian nation of about 55 million people.<\/p>\n<p>Since Burma\u2019s independence (as the country was then known) from the British in 1948, the state centre has been in near-continuous conflict with ethnic minority communities who call the country\u2019s highland borderlands their home.<\/p>\n<p>Many were promised autonomy after decolonisation, but that never materialised.<\/p>\n<p>The military and its leaders have been tightly woven into the country\u2019s social and political fabric for more than six decades and have come to oversee a vast business empire that encompasses everything from natural resource extraction to beer sales.<\/p>\n<p>Bolstered by arms sales from China and Russia, the military now deploys fighter jets, attack helicopters, tanks and a growing arsenal of drones in its civil war fight.<\/p>\n<p>Many of its adversaries were once protesters who brandished little but laminated signs with anti-coup messages; some had slingshots.<\/p>\n<p>But a bloody crackdown by the military drove many peaceful demonstrators to <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2024\/5\/17\/western-volunteers-join-the-battle-against-myanmars-military-regime\">seek combat training<\/a> from the seasoned armed ethnic rebels in the borderlands, which fused decades-old struggles for an autonomous identity with a mass push for democracy in the aftermath of 2021.<\/p>\n<p>After years of revolt, the military faced a sprawling resistance unlike any in its history. Doubts even crept in over whether the military could survive.<\/p>\n<p>Now, amid a resurgence \u2013 on the back of atrocities and mass subscription \u2013 and factionalism among opponents, the balance of power is tilting back in the military\u2019s favour.<\/p>\n<p>But the war looks set to grind on.<\/p>\n<p>So far, international conflict monitor ACLED estimates more than 96,000 people have been killed in Myanmar\u2019s civil war, while the United Nations says at least 3.6 million have been displaced.<\/p>\n<p>To grasp the breadth and complexity of Myanmar\u2019s civil war, it helps to see four broad camps in the war: the military regime, led by Min Aung Hlaing; a range of ethnic armed groups; post-coup forces aligned with the shadow administration of the National Unity Government (NUG); and newer resistance groups fighting to transform the political order.<\/p>\n<p>One thing is constant in the civil war \u2014 alliances are fluid and sometimes collapse into conflict.<\/p>\n<p>Through this kaleidoscopic lens, Myanmar\u2019s political and military dynamics \u2013 and possible trajectories \u2013 come into focus.<\/p>\n<h3>The military<\/h3>\n<p>The Myanmar military\u2019s character \u2013 a mix of brutality and rigid obedience \u2013 dates back to its formation under Japanese imperial forces \u2018 tutelage during World War II. At the military\u2019s core is an ideology that casts the armed forces as guardians of an almost exclusively Buddhist society, with the ethnic Bamar majority at the centre of the nation.<\/p>\n<p>The military seeks to preserve Bamar dominance while absorbing the country\u2019s many ethnic minorities into a centralised state in a subordinate role, said Morgan Michaels of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), based at IISS-Asia.<\/p>\n<p>Michaels estimates the military fields between 150,000 and 250,000 soldiers, with up to 100,000 conscripts bolstering military ranks since draft laws were rushed into force in 2024 after rebel fighters inflicted heavy losses on the battlefield.<\/p>\n<p>Conscription, together with pressure from Beijing on the ethnic armies situated on the China-Myanmar border, has halted earlier rapid advances against the military.<\/p>\n<p>Reduced weapons flows to resistance groups, support from armed militias for the military, as well as improved tactics, have helped the military claw back much lost ground, Michaels said.<\/p>\n<p>Long accused of attacking civilians, the military\u2019s air campaign has also evolved into \u201ca high tempo of intelligence-driven strikes\u201d targeting personnel, infrastructure and logistics, Michaels added.<\/p>\n<p>On the other side of the conflict, the myriad opposition forces stacked against the military have \u201cfailed to unite\u201d, he said.<\/p>\n<p>They may even be \u201cincapable of strategic evolution\u201d, he said.<\/p>\n<p>Though the military is \u201cideologically cohesive\u201d, Michaels said, \u201cdeep-seated disaffection\u201d with commander Min Aung Hlaing could raise the prospect of internal tensions as a future route for the conflict to navigate.<\/p>\n<h3>People\u2019s Defence Force (PDF)<\/h3>\n<p>The 2021 coup \u2013 and the bloodshed that followed as troops fired on street demonstrations against military rule \u2013 pushed protesters to take up arms, nationalising what has now become a protracted civil war.<\/p>\n<p>Forming resistance groups, they captured swaths of countryside in the central drylands and the south of the country. Others sought out and fought under the leadership of ethnic armies in exchange for training and weapons with which to fight the military.<\/p>\n<p>These resistance groups, known as the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2024\/9\/27\/myanmar-military-urges-anti-coup-forces-to-give-up-struggle-and-join-talks\">People\u2019s Defence Force (PDF)<\/a>, nominally operate under the leadership of the National Unity Government (NUG), a shadow government formed by Myanmar lawmakers removed by the military coup.<\/p>\n<p>In fighting the PDF, the military found itself confronting its own ethnic Bamar \u2013 historically the military\u2019s core support base \u2013 face to face.<\/p>\n<p>In 2022, the NUG claimed roughly 250 PDF battalions, suggesting about 100,000 personnel, although this likely includes noncombat roles, said Armed Conflict Location and Event Data\u2019s (ACLED) Asia Pacific senior analyst Su Mon.<\/p>\n<p>With casualties mounting, recruitment slowing and some troops under the command of ethnic armed groups, the number of PDF fighters is likely lower, said Su Mon, noting that the PDF \u201cappear to be managing a gradual loss of strength\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>The PDF sources their weapons from battlefield seizures from the military, surplus from ethnic allies, sales on the black market, homemade weapons production, and defecting soldiers. But those supplies have tightened, and so has funding to buy weapons \u2013 from diaspora donations overseas, local taxation and online fundraising campaigns.<\/p>\n<p>Originally, the PDF was \u201cenvisioned as a national army, even as a potential substitute for the Myanmar military,\u201d said Su Mon.<\/p>\n<p>But the NUG has struggled to unify the disparate militias that comprise the PDF or provide sufficient resources to help make it a force that could be recognised as truly national.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cAlthough the NUG has attempted to bring these scattered groups under a unified command structure, it continues to struggle,\u201d Su Mon said.<\/p>\n<h3>Ethnic armed groups<\/h3>\n<p>Ethnic armed groups have dealt the most serious blows to the military regime.<\/p>\n<p>But these groups are not uniformly aligned with the pro-democracy movement, the PDF or the NUG, and their goals often diverge from one ethnic group to another.<\/p>\n<p>In many cases, the military coup has sharpened differences among the ethnic groups themselves, of which there are about 20.<\/p>\n<p>After decades of conflict, some have fractured and fought each other. While some remain focused on autonomy, others are driven more by financial interests or the influence of neighbouring China. For some, the current period of revolution burns with urgent necessity. For others, it is more of a bargaining chip for sectional interests.<\/p>\n<p>The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) illustrates this tension.<\/p>\n<p>This Mandarin-speaking ethnic Kokang force, with 8,000 to 10,000 fighters, initially embraced the uprising against the Myanmar military, forming a mixed-ethnicity brigade of anti-military protesters turned rebel fighters. But after capturing the city of Lashio during the 2023 offensive, the MNDAA handed its hard-won prize back to the military under pressure from Beijing.<\/p>\n<p>The MNDAA now faces a tense standoff with a former ethnic ally for the leftovers of the territory it took from the military.<\/p>\n<p>Amara Thiha, an analyst at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, said the MNDAA\u2019s \u201cmost significant battlefield achievements\u201d against Myanmar\u2019s military \u201care reversible through Beijing\u2019s diplomatic preference\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>IISS\u2019s Michaels described the MNDAA as \u201cmore akin to a heavily armed cartel with administrative capacities rather than an ideologically or politically motivated armed movement\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Other ethnic armed groups occupy a middle ground, pursuing autonomy while navigating pressure from both China and rivals.<\/p>\n<p>The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) stands out as one of the most capable and most closely aligned with the broader resistance and its pro-democracy aspirations, said Amara Thiha.<\/p>\n<p>With up to 30,000 troops and revenue streams from rare earth mining, the KIA has integrated operations with other forces that emerged in the aftermath of the military coup.<\/p>\n<p>In the country\u2019s eastern Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) has built a 40,000-strong force equipped with artillery, armoured vehicles and drones, while also developing governance structures in liberated areas that resemble a proto-state.<\/p>\n<p>The AA\u2019s long-term ambitions may include independence, depending on how the conflict evolves, said Bangkok-based security analyst Anthony Davis.<\/p>\n<p>The AA\u2019s rise is tied to the fate of the Rohingya, a Muslim minority driven into Bangladesh during a 2017 military campaign widely described as genocidal. More than 750,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar to refugee camps in Bangladesh\u2019s Cox\u2019s Bazar, where they still languish.<\/p>\n<p>Amid reports of AA abuses and Rohingya militancy against the AA, the future of Rohingya communities \u2013 both in Rakhine and neighbouring Bangladesh \u2013 remains uncertain.<\/p>\n<p>Other major players among the ethnic armed groups include the Karen National Union, with about 15,000 troops along the Myanmar-Thai border, and the United Wa State Army, the country\u2019s best-equipped ethnic force, with roughly 30,000 fighters on the Myanmar-China border and strong backing from Beijing.<\/p>\n<h3>Other resistance groups<\/h3>\n<p>The emergence of the PDF was followed by a cascade of independent fighting forces, from small unit village watches to larger regional alliances, some of which have viewed the revolution as not only a chance to transform the inequities of an old political system but also to address ethnic discrimination.<\/p>\n<p>Examples include the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force in eastern Kayah State, the Chin Brotherhood in western Myanmar, and the Bamar People\u2019s Liberation Army, led by a prominent poet who espouses equality among ethnicities, as a Bamar force.<\/p>\n<p>In November 2025, these nation-spanning forces coalesced into the 19-member Spring Revolution Alliance, with a combined strength of about 10,000 fighters.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cMany of these groups are led by younger activists with clearly articulated political objectives,\u201d Su Mon said.<\/p>\n<h3>What next for Myanmar\u2019s civil war?<\/h3>\n<p>Observers expect regime leader Min Aung Hlaing to remain in charge of the military, and potentially transition his role into that of an unelected presidency.<\/p>\n<p>Barring a major shock, such as an internal coup inside the military or a shift in China\u2019s policy towards the regime, IISS\u2019s Michaels expects the military to continue its battlefield gains this year, followed by \u201cdeeper advances\u201d over the next decade.<\/p>\n<p>A ceasefire or peace talks could give opposition forces space to consolidate, he said, but otherwise \u201ctheir positions will be gradually eroded in the coming years until negotiations are forced upon them\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Su Mon also points to mounting strain on the PDF due to a lack of strong political leadership, as military offensives intensify amid economic hardships.<\/p>\n<p>Some PDF battalions have reportedly disarmed because of these pressures, she said.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWithout improved institutional support, resources, or mechanisms for replenishment, many PDF groups risk gradually dwindling over time,\u201d she said.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Myanmar has entered the sixth year of a brutal civil war that the military regime, which seized control of the country in 2021, is increasingly confident it can win. The conflict was triggered when the country\u2019s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing ousted an elected government and detained civilian leaders, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung &#8230; <a title=\"Who is fighting in Myanmar\u2019s multi-front civil war?\" class=\"read-more\" href=\"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/2026\/03\/27\/who-is-fighting-in-myanmars-multi-front-civil-war\/\" aria-label=\"Read more about Who is fighting in Myanmar\u2019s multi-front civil war?\">Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":5688,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5687","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-travel"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5687","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5687"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5687\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5688"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5687"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5687"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pronews.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5687"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}